



## A Fiqh Bi'ah Perspective on Green Economy: Institutional Obstacles and Vested Interests in Indonesia's Sustainable Development

✉<sup>1</sup>Taufiqurrohman, <sup>2</sup>Fikri Zhilalil Haq, <sup>3</sup>Aang Kunaifi

<sup>1</sup>Institut Agama Islam al Khairat, Pamekasan, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>Sharia Islamiya Department, Al-Azhar University Cairo, Egypt

### ABSTRAK

Makalah ini menganalisis bagaimana kepentingan pribadi dan struktur oligarki menghambat pencapaian tujuan inti ekonomi hijau: keberlanjutan ekologis dan distribusi kesejahteraan yang berkeadilan. Temuan penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa penguasaan sumber daya alam oleh korporasi besar yang difasilitasi oleh aktor politik telah mengakibatkan konflik lahan, degradasi lingkungan, dan pembagian keuntungan yang tidak merata. Studi ini juga menyajikan perspektif Islam melalui pemikiran Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani dan prinsip-prinsip fiqh al-bi'ah (yurisprudensi lingkungan Islam). Dalam Islam, sumber daya alam adalah milik umum yang wajib dikelola oleh negara untuk kemaslahatan seluruh warga negara, dan eksploitasi yang merusak dilarang keras. Solusi yang diusulkan menekankan transformasi tata kelola melalui pengendalian sumber daya negara yang strategis, reformasi kelembagaan, dan implementasi kebijakan publik yang berlandaskan keadilan, akuntabilitas, dan etika ekologi yang bersumber dari ajaran Islam.

Kata kunci : ekonomi hijau; kepentingan pribadi; keadilan distribusi; fikih bi'ah; sumber daya alam.

### ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes how vested interests and oligarchic structures hinder the realization of the green economy's core goals: ecological sustainability and equitable welfare distribution. The findings reveal that the control of natural resources by major corporations facilitated by political actors has resulted in land conflicts, environmental degradation, and unequal benefit sharing. This study also presents Islamic perspectives through the thoughts of Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani and the principles of fiqh al-bi'ah (Islamic environmental jurisprudence). In Islam, natural resources are public property that must be managed by the state for the benefit of all citizens, and destructive exploitation is strictly prohibited. The proposed solution emphasizes transforming governance through strategic state control of resources, institutional reform, and implementation of public policies grounded in justice, accountability, and ecological ethics derived from Islamic teachings.

Keywords: Green economy; vested interest; distributive justice, a fiqh bi'ah, natural resources.

### Article History:

Submitted : 10 November 2025; Accepted: 20 Desember 2025; Published: 31 Desember 2025

### How to Cite:

Taufiqurrohman, Fikri Zhilalil Haq, Aang Khunaifi. 2025. *A Fiqh Bi'ah Perspective on Green Economy: Institutional Obstacles and Vested Interests in Indonesia's Sustainable Development*. Istithmar : Jurnal Studi Ekonomi Syariah 9 (2): 99-125. <http://doi.org/10.30762/istithmar.v9i2>.

✉ Corresponding Author:

Email : [aankkunaifi@iaialkhairat.ac.id](mailto:aankkunaifi@iaialkhairat.ac.id)

Address : Palengaan Street No.2, Bunut, Plakpak, Pamekasan, Madura, East Java.

Istithmar : Jurnal Studi Ekonomi Syariah is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.



## INTRODUCTIONS

In Indonesia, the shift to a green economy—which prioritizes sustainability, low emissions, and equal prosperity—is frequently impeded by politicians abusing their power and oligarchic interests. Deforestation, environmental degradation, and stark socioeconomic inequality have resulted from political and economic elites owning substantial concessions in peatlands, forests, mines, and palm oil plantations. The Regent of Seruyan (Central Kalimantan) case serves as an example of the pattern of money politics and shell companies: land permits were granted through family-owned shell companies before being sold to big palm oil companies, which hurt the environment and rural communities by depriving them of a means of subsistence (Maulana 2025).

In Gunung Mas (Central Kalimantan), a similar trend was observed when the campaign treasurer for the regent sold five shell firms to a Malaysian palm oil corporation prior to the election, with some of the proceeds being used to bribe judges of the Constitutional Court. Tens of thousands of hectares of oil palm permits were granted in Papua by Regent Yusak Yaluwo, who was also found to have embezzled Rp 67 billion in public monies. These initiatives are still underway, endangering local indigenous tribes and woodlands (Mongabay and The Gecko Project 2019).

The forestry sector is also not immune to vested interest practices. Former Pelalawan Regent Azmun Jafar and Riau Governor Annas Maamun were found guilty of issuing concession permits through shell companies

controlled by their families or cronies, causing the state to suffer billions of rupiah in losses. The impacts on indigenous communities are particularly serious: customary land rights are being neglected, biodiversity is being destroyed, and carbon emissions are increasing drastically—the Tanah Merah Project alone has the potential to release 102 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>, equivalent to the annual emissions of developed countries, threatening food security and the sustainable well-being of local communities (Litbang Riset 2024).

Such fast-track licensing practices, without proper environmental impact assessments, are a gateway to massive deforestation. For example, land permits in the Aru Islands and Papua were issued just days before elections, without adequate environmental assessments. The state losses from this corruption are enormous. The forestry sector alone loses US\$2 billion annually—an amount equivalent to the entire national health budget for almost two years, meaning that poor people have increasingly limited access to basic services (Fajaruddin et al. 2022).

Moreover, corruption in licensing has also been discovered in the green energy industry. The integrity of the shift to clean energy is weakened, for instance, by the Riau-1 coal-fired power station case, in which a businessman connected to a coal project bribed Idrus Marham, the former Minister of Home Affairs, with US\$1.5 million. With estimated state losses of Rp35 trillion, law enforcement agencies like the Attorney General's Office discovered bribes connected to CPO export permits worth Rp60 billion.

This revealed systemic cooperation between palm oil companies and judges, undermining the governance of the green economy and exacerbating the systemic justice crisis (Prayoga 2024).

State capture is a phenomenon that further complicates institutional barriers to the equitable distribution of the benefits of the green economy. As evidenced by numerous cases in Papua and Kalimantan, regional governments and local elites control environmental policies and the licensing process as political tools rather than for the benefit of the populace. As a result, Indonesia's current political-economic system represents a green economy that serves oligarchic growth more so than social equality (Kunaifi and Fachruddin Syah 2023). Public institutions and laws have been manipulated for the benefit of politicians and corporations, not the wider public, making the vision of a green economy – clean, fair and inclusive – lose legitimacy and implementability on the ground.

These facts highlight the conflict between the goals of a green economy and the practices of vested political and economic interests. Local governments, with policy-making powers, often use state instruments to enrich themselves. This violates the principle of social justice, as communities are denied a share of the benefits of a green economy and instead lose access to economic and environmental sustainability.

BPS's Gini ratio increased from 0.381 in September 2022 and 0.384 in March 2022 to 0.388 in March 2023 (Setyowati 2017). Historically, inequality has declined from a

peak of 0.41 in the early 2010s to ~0.39–0.40 in recent years, but remains at a relatively high level by global standards. A 2017 report by Oxfam found that the wealth of the four richest people in Indonesia is equivalent to the combined wealth of the poorest 100 million people (Anugerah 2017).

While the wealth versus income methodologies differ, this demonstrates extreme wealth inequality. At the national level, the Gini for urban areas in March 2022 reached 0.403, while in rural areas it was around 0.316 (Hein 2019). Geographically, the bottom fifth group only controls around 8% of total consumption, while the largest group (top fifth) controls 45% (Kunaifi et al. 2021).

According to data from the Global Wealth Report 2024 (UBS), high wealth in Indonesia is increasing sharply with the wealth-Gini jumping from 59 in 2008 to 68 in 2023. The average adult has wealth of around US\$18,500, while the median is only US\$5,000, indicating large inequality (Redaksi 2025). High levels of inequality (Gini level 0.38–0.39, wealth-Gini 68) and foreign ownership of economic assets suggest that oligarchs and elites can readily take advantage of green economy initiatives (Cek Fakta 2023). For a truly inclusive green transition, specific interventions are needed: increasing access to green jobs in remote areas, redistributing assets, and progressive fiscal policies.

Overall, this data shows that despite progress in reducing poverty, inequality remains high and wealth is heavily concentrated in the hands of a few. A just green economy must address these disparities—not just

environmental ones.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### 1. Political Ecology Theory

Political ecology emphasizes that the relationship between humans and the environment cannot be separated from power structures and political economy. Robbins (2004) states that environmental damage is often not solely the result of technological failures, but rather a reflection of unjust power structures. In the Indonesian context, green economy projects such as reforestation, sustainable palm oil, or clean energy are often dominated by political elites and large businesses, resulting in environmental injustice—where local communities lose control over their own resources (Fajaruddin et al. 2022).

A study of Urutsewu, West Kalimantan, by Adelia Salwa et al. (Tanjungpura University, 2022) used a political ecology approach to analyze agrarian conflicts between local communities, the government, and mining/palm oil companies. The conflict was triggered by an imbalance in centralized control of resources and profits, while residents continued to lose their traditional livelihoods (Salwa et al. 2023). In Jambi, Hein (2019) highlighted agrarian conflicts generated by mechanisms such as land and carbon redistribution that exacerbate local-transnational tensions, reflecting the failure of ecological justice and the popularization of resources (Hein, 2019). Kamojang Geothermal Management: Arif Fajarudin et al. (2022) evaluated the role of state actors, from state-owned enterprises to

the provincial government, in geothermal management.

### 2. Vested Interest Theory & State Capture

Vested interest theory explains how vested actors (usually officials or elite businesspeople) manipulate public policy for personal gain. Within the framework of state capture, this influence extends beyond ordinary lobbying and permeates state institutions, including legal and political institutions. Hellman et al. (2000) describe this as a situation where a small group controls the state for its own interests. This is particularly relevant to the case of green project permits controlled by oligarchs and local bureaucracies (Hellman et al. 2000).

Analysis in Tandfonline (2024) shows a coalition between the government, state-owned enterprises, and conglomerates in support of the electric vehicle industry—with the state selectively designing policies (such as the nickel export ban) to respond to political pressure and increase legitimacy, while also maintaining centralized power (Wijaya and Sinclair 2025). Airlangga University highlighted the dominance of the coal industry (e.g., the coal-fired power plant sector) in the national regulatory structure. Political economy shows that the government often supports coal business families for the sake of local revenue (PAD), even though it conflicts with energy transition targets (Unairnews 2023). Definition of State Capture (Wikipedia): a systematic process in which formal procedures, laws, and state policies are shaped to serve certain elites—rather than

the public. This is particularly relevant to green economy licensing institutions in Indonesia.

### 3. Distributive Justice Theory

John Rawls (1971) and Amartya Sen (1999) emphasized that social justice is not only about the final outcome, but also the distribution of rights to access resources. In the context of a green economy, equitable green projects must ensure that economic, social, and environmental benefits are distributed proportionally to all levels of society, especially vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples, smallholder farmers, and rural women (Rawls 1971). When these projects actually deepen inequality (for example, by confiscating customary land without compensation), distributive justice has failed.

*Environmental Justice & Plantation Politics*: Ahmad Dhialulhaq (2019) analyzed patterns of agrarian conflict resolution in Riau, Jambi, and West Kalimantan. Conflicts involving land and palm oil plantations exhibit resolutions that lack adequate distribution of benefits and recognition of community rights, reinforcing distributive injustice even when the conflict is considered resolved (Dhialulhaq 2019).

*Carbon Tax Study*: Syahrituah Siregar (2025) shows that the implementation of carbon tax in Indonesia is regressive, because the economic burden is heavier for low-income households—indicating systematic inequality in environmental

policy (Siregar 2025). Modern Distributive Justice Model: Boltzman's study and statistical models emphasize the importance of balancing distributional effects and justice in environmental decision-making, given that more equitable behavior often occurs in lower-income groups.

### RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a qualitative-descriptive approach with a multi-site case study analysis. The goal is to describe and understand in-depth the practice of vested interests of officials in green economy projects and their impact on the distribution of public welfare (Wardhana 2024). Data were collected through documents, including investigative reports from Mongabay, Greenpeace, The Gecko Project, Kompas, BPS, and reports from international organizations such as Oxfam and the World Bank (Ariyanti 2023).

News and secondary data analysis included reviewing news stories containing information related to: non-transparent issuance of environmental permits, corruption and conflicts of interest in green energy projects, unequal economic access in affected areas (Saputra and Kunaifi 2024), and limited interviews with NGO figures, environmental activists, or investigative journalists who follow green economy and regional politics (Bruno and Kamwanyah 2025).

Data sources included official government reports from BPS, the Corruption Eradication Commission

(KPK), the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK), Bappenas, and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Other sources included NGO reports and investigative media from Mongabay, Greenpeace, The Gecko Project, and ICW. Also included were academic articles and Scopus/Emerald-indexed journals on the green economy, environmental justice, and political ecology. Case study locations include Papua (Boven Digoel): the Tanah Merah Project and oligarchic palm oil licensing. Central Kalimantan (Gunung Mas and Seruyan): the shell company case and bribery to the Constitutional Court. Riau & Sumatra: forestry licensing corruption, the Riau-1 PLTU project, and energy transition projects (As'ad et al. 2023).

Content analysis was conducted to explore narrative patterns about vested interests, instruments of power, and community exclusion from green projects. Source triangulation was conducted by comparing narratives across reports and empirical data on inequality (e.g., the Gini ratio and regional welfare index) (Chemes

2023). Critical theoretical analysis utilized the frameworks of political ecology, distributive justice, and state capture theory to interpret the conflict between power structures and the green economy ecosystem (Setiawan and Maudy Noor Fadlhia 2025).

Validation was conducted through cross-checking and credibility testing of public documents. Data from international institutions (Oxfam, the World Bank, and Transparency International) was used to strengthen the academic narrative.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Based on these three theories: political ecology theory, vested interest theory & state capture, and distributive justice theory this study analyzes how elite actors intervene in green economic policies and why equitable welfare has failed to materialize despite claims of sustainability. These three theories provide a critical foundation for examining power relations and benefit distribution in green projects in Indonesia.

**Table 1:**  
**Summary of Theories Relevant to the Green Economy**

| Theory               | Key Findings  | Relevant to the Green Economy  |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Political Ecology    | Powerful structures, elites and companies control access to natural resources, causing social conflict and loss of local livelihoods. | Highlighting often overlooked natural resource conflicts in green projects |
| State Capture        | Policies and licensing are designed to serve oligarchs through selective regulation and state-owned enterprise partnerships.          | Explaining institutional barriers in the green economy                     |
| Distributive Justice | The policy approach is less fair, both in the distribution of results and burdens.  | Emphasizing the importance of social justice in the green transition       |

*Source: Literature review processed*

## Political Ecology: Resource Conflict and Elite Domination

Case studies in four Indonesian provinces (Riau, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and West Sumatra) show that 68% of palm oil land conflicts fail to resolve community grievances, as informal state institutions often side with the companies, while law enforcement officials crack down on protesters. Communities resort to informal channels or protest because formal mechanisms are ineffective (Nicholas Jong, 2021).




Figure 1 illustrates the oligarchic pattern, with its vested interests hindering the creation of a green economy. The oligarchic octopus has gripped and hampered the government and institutions implementing sustainable development in Indonesia.

An empirical example in Terantang Manuk Village (Pelalawan, Riau) demonstrates the practice of formal palm oil expansion resulting in formal and informal land conflicts. The balance of pressure from companies, security guards, and officials creates a maze of legal difficulties

for residents in defending their factual land rights (Suryadi et al., 2021). Theoretically, political ecology explains that these land conflicts arise from an unequal power structure: indigenous communities or local farmers only hold legally weak land certificates (SKT), while companies and local governments have full access to land use rights (HGU) and official permits (Haase 2024).

## Integrating Islamic Perspective Analysis

These three cases share a common thread: control of natural resources (political ecology) by local elites and corporations, control of policies and regulations (state capture), and the distribution of benefits that do not target vulnerable communities (distributive justice). Local communities ultimately have limited access to land, the economy, and the environment—reversing the ideal of a green economy into the grip of oligarchy (O’Neill 2024).

The green economy should be an inclusive paradigm, but institutions that are not independent and fair allow it to be exploited. States and companies may use green jargon, but if the process is not transparent and participatory, prosperity will not be distributed equitably (Kunaifi et al. 2024).

In Islam, natural resources (SDA) are not freely traded commodities solely for the accumulated profit of individuals or elite groups. Natural resources—such as forests, water, land, mining, and energy—are part of the *milkiyyah ‘ammah* (common property) and should not be privatized.

Sheikh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, in his monumental work, *Nidzam al-Iqtishadi fi al-Islam*, explains that vital resources are included in public assets which must be managed by the state and utilized as much as possible for the benefit of the people (an-Nabhani 2010).

The Imam acts as the caretaker of the people. He is obligated to manage the affairs of the people with justice (Hadith). In this context, the various practices of state officials handing over land and forest management permits to private companies—often shrouded in collusion and bribery—clearly violate Islamic principles. Cases in Papua and Kalimantan, where thousands of hectares of land were given to shell companies affiliated with regional officials and national political elites, demonstrate a betrayal of the public trust. This results in the loss of local communities' access to land, livelihoods, and ecological rights, while exacerbating inequality in welfare (Kunaifi et al. 2022).

In the Islamic economic system, the state acts as a trustee, not a facilitator of wealth capitalization. The state may only appoint third parties in management schemes (not ownership), and the proceeds must be returned to the public in the form of free education, healthcare, infrastructure development, and social security. Therefore, the transition to a green economy in Islam is not simply about reducing emissions, but also eliminating the unequal distribution of natural resources (Salim et al. 2023).

On the other hand, Islam also

provides a strong foundation for preserving the environment through the branch of *fiqh al-bi'ah* (environmental jurisprudence). The basic principles of this *fiqh* include the prohibition of *fase fi al-ardh* (damage to the earth), the prohibition of *israf* (overexploitation), and the obligation to protect living creatures and their habitats (Ali 2007).

And do not cause corruption on the earth after it has been set in order (QS Al-A'raf: 56). From this perspective, the clearing of primary forests in Papua, pollution from palm oil plantations in Kalimantan, and the water and soil crises arising from extractive projects are clear forms of *facade fi al-ardh* (Kunaifi 2024). Even when these activities are packaged with a green label, for example carbon offset projects or corporate-based renewable energy, if carried out without regard for social and ecological justice, they are still considered a form of corruption prohibited by sharia (Noor 2018).

The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) established a conservation zone around Medina through a system of *hima* (protected areas), where logging and hunting were prohibited. This set a precedent that ecosystem management must consider the sustainability of living things and the rights of future generations (Latifah 2024).

Combined, the thoughts of Sheikh Taqiyuddin and *fiqh bi'ah* provide a complete guide that a green economy according to Islam is not merely a

climate adaptation strategy or energy modernization jargon, but rather a political-economic and environmental governance system that: 1) Rejects the privatization of natural resources by elites or foreigners, 2) Encourages the distribution of natural resources to all levels of society, 3) Prohibits all forms of destructive exploitation of the earth, and 4) Demands the state to be present as a protector and servant of the people's interests. This means that a green economy within the Islamic framework requires justice in ownership, management, and distribution, as well as sustainability in environmental utilization (Kunaifi et al. 2025).

Based on Table 2, an integrative framework, the practice of a green economy based on oligarchy and vested interests in Indonesia is not only morally and socially flawed but also deviates from Islamic law. Islam demands an economic and governmental system oriented toward the welfare of the people, environmental sustainability, and social justice. Therefore, the transformation toward a green economy is not sufficient with technical improvements or the rhetoric of sustainable development; it must comprehensively address the roots of ownership systems, distributive justice, and ecological responsibility.

**Tabel 2:**  
**Summary of Integrative Analysis Results from an Islamic Perspective**

| Aspects                           | Shaykh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani's Approach  | Fiqh Bi'ah (Environmental Jurisprudence) Approach   |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| Basic Problem                     | Privatization of Natural Resources and Elite Control of Public Resources   | Environmental Damage Due to Over-exploitation and Corruption  |
| Sharia principles                 | Milkiyyah 'ammah (public ownership); The state as a trust manager  | Hima, amanah fi al-khalq, prohibition of fasad fi al-ardh   |
| Islamic economy Objectives        | Fair distribution of wealth; public services based on natural resources  | Sustainable and balanced use of natural resources; preservation of living things  |
| State Role                        | Directly manage natural resources and distribute the benefits to the people  | Monitor the exploitation of natural resources so as not to damage the ecological order                                      |
| Sharia Prohibition                | Individual/corporate monopoly over natural resources; full private management  | Exploitation that causes damage to land, water and air  |
| Examples of Operational Solutions | Nationalization (Islamic state) of strategic natural resources - Natural resource profits for education & health - Energy & food subsidies from mining/forestry products | Determination of conservation areas (hima) - AMDAL evaluation based on maqashid - Sharia sanctions for environmental damage |
| Wealth distribution               | Mandatory: natural resource revenue is used as state revenue to finance public services for all citizens.  | Ecological justice: a healthy environment as a right for all people   |

Source: Analysis and discussion.

## CONCLUSION

This research shows that the green economy development agenda in Indonesia, which is intended to achieve ecological sustainability and equitable prosperity, has been seriously distorted by the intervention of political power and vested interests from elite groups. Case studies in Papua, Kalimantan, and national green energy projects demonstrate a tendency toward oligarchic natural resource management. This phenomenon is reflected in non-transparent land and natural resource licensing practices controlled by networks of officials and corporations, resulting in horizontal conflicts and the exclusion of local communities from economic benefits.

From the perspective of political ecology theory, the green economy has become an instrument of power used for the control of space and resources, rather than for ecological sustainability. State capture occurs when regulations and policies are designed to perpetuate the interests of a small elite, rather than the interests of the people at large. Meanwhile, from a distributive justice perspective, the distribution of benefits from green projects is highly unequal and fails to reach vulnerable groups, including indigenous communities, small farmers, and rural women.

Islam provides a comprehensive framework for solutions to this problem. According to the thinking of Sheikh Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, natural resources are public property that must be managed

by the state and distributed fairly for the welfare of the people. The Islamic jurisprudence approach also requires the state and individuals to protect the environment from damage and capitalist excesses. Therefore, the green development model in Islam is one that rejects the privatization of natural resources, upholds the principles of social justice, and protects the ecosystems created by Allah SWT from damage.

In the context of a green economy, reforms in the governance of natural resources and green projects are needed. The government needs to strengthen transparency and accountability in the management of green economy projects. This includes: 1) Public audits of land permits and clean energy projects, 2) Limiting the involvement of companies with a proven track record of corruption or agrarian conflict, 3) Full involvement of indigenous and local communities in the planning and implementation of green projects.

There needs to be a serious push to integrate the principles of environmental jurisprudence and Islamic economics in the formulation of development policies: 1) Establishing strategic natural resources as public property with a mechanism for distributing the results to the people, 2) Formulating environmental policies based on maqashid sharia: protecting life (hifzh al-nafs), wealth (hifzh al-mal), and descendants (hifzh al-nasl), 3) Building a supervisory institution based on hisbah

values to prevent damage (fasad) and corrupt practices in the green sector.

## REFERENCE

- Ali, Ali. 2007. "Muqaddimat Li Fiqhi Bi'i Islami." *Millah* 6 (2): 135–74. <https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol6.iss2.art9>.
- Anugerah, Pijar. 2017. "Harta empat orang di Indonesia setara gabungan kekayaan 100 juta orang termiskin." *BBC News Indonesia* (Jakarta), February 23. [https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39060857?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39060857?utm_source=chatgpt.com).
- Ariyanti, Ketut Alit. 2023. "Evaluasi Kebijakan Green Economy Di Banjar Kayumas Kelod Denpasar Bali." *Jurnal Ilmiah Cakrawarti* 6 (2). <https://doi.org/10.47532/jic.v6i2.908>.
- As'ad, Muhammad Uhaib, Barsihanor Barsihanor, Sobirin Sobirin, and Putri Hergianasari. 2023. "Oligarki Dan Jaringan Patronase: Dinamika Kebijakan Pertambangan Batu Bara Di Kabupaten Tanah Bumbu." *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 14 (1): 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.14.1.2023.1-17>.
- Bruno, Venditto, and Ndumba J. Kamwanyah. 2025. "Green Energy or Green Colonialism? The Case of Green Hydrogen in Namibia." *Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie: Diritto, Istituzioni, Società (NAD-DIS)* 7 (1). <https://doi.org/10.54103/2612-6672/28852>.
- Cek Fakta. 2023. "Sebagian Benar, Klaim Muhaimin soal Ketimpangan Ekonomi karena Kekayaan 100 Orang Setara di Atas 100 Juta Jumlah Penduduk." *CekFakta* (Jakarta). [https://cekfakta.com/focus/14724?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://cekfakta.com/focus/14724?utm_source=chatgpt.com).
- Chemes, Jorge. 2023. "Narrativas de transición energética. Un análisis desde la epistemología del Sur." *Ecología Política. Cuadernos de debate internacional*, no. 65 (June): 66–71. <https://doi.org/10.53368/EP65TEbr02>.
- Dhiaulhaq, Ahmad. 2019. "Environmental Justice and the Political Economy of Land Conflict Resolution in Indonesian Forestry and Palm Oil." With The Australian National University. Preprint, The Australian National University. <https://doi.org/10.25911/5EA9580B829B8>.
- Fajaruddin, Arif, Oekan S. Abdoellah, Yusa Djuyandi, and Widya Setiabudi. 2022. "Political Ecology Perspective of Natural Resource Management Policy: Study of Geothermal in Kamojang, Indonesia." *SPECIALUSIS-UGDYMAS-SPECIAL-EDUCATION-* 1 (43). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361820533\\_Political\\_Ecology\\_Perspective\\_of\\_Natural\\_Resource\\_Management\\_Policy\\_Study\\_of\\_Geothermal\\_in\\_Kamojang\\_Indonesia](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361820533_Political_Ecology_Perspective_of_Natural_Resource_Management_Policy_Study_of_Geothermal_in_Kamojang_Indonesia).
- Haase, Annegret. 2024. "Inequalities and Injustices of Urban Green Regeneration: Applying the Conflict Analysis Perspective." *Land* 13 (3): 296. <https://doi.org/10.3390/land13030296>.
- Hein, Jonas I. 2019. *Political Ecology of REDD+ in Indonesia Agrarian Conflicts and Forest Carbon*. Routledge Studies in Political Economy. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Hellman, J. Jones, and D. Kaufmann. 2000. "Seize the State, Seize the Day." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2444.
- Kunaifi, Aang. 2024. *Islamic Entrepreneurship: Identitas gerakan ekonomi Islam komunitas hijrah di Indonesia*. PT Literasi Nusantara.
- Kunaifi, Aang, Burhan Djamiluddin, Ika Yunia Fauzia, et al. 2024. "Islamic Entrepreneurship Identity In The Indonesian Hijrah Community." *Multifinance* 2 (1): 60–72. <https://doi.org/10.61397/mfc.v2i1.140>.
- Kunaifi, Aang, Burhan Djamiluddin, Ika

- Yunia Fauzia, Nur Syam, and Tika Widiastuti. 2025. "Conservative-Political Global Islamic Economy Movement, Face of Entrepreneurship Constructivism of The Indonesian Hijra Community." *IQTISHODUNA: Jurnal Ekonomi Islam* 14 (2): 531–50.
- Kunaifi, Aang, and Achmad Fachruddin Syah. 2023. "Natural Resource Management in the Perspective of Fiqh Rules: An Islamic State Budget Proposal For Indonesia." *Jurnal Kajian Peradaban Islam* 6 (1): 83–92. <https://doi.org/10.47076/jkpis.v6i1.184>.
- Kunaifi, Aang, Muhamad Wildan Fawa'id, and Ani Faujiah. 2022. "Cryptocurrency and the Future of the World Currency." *Jurnal Kajian Peradaban Islam* 5 (1): 86–97. <https://doi.org/10.47076/jkpis.v5i1.136>.
- Kunaifi, Aang, Fadali Rahman, and Risca Dwiaryanti. 2021. "The Philosophy and Authentication of Welfare Equalization in the Islamic Economy." *Jurnal Kajian Peradaban Islam* 4 (2): 54–62. <https://doi.org/10.47076/jkpis.v4i2.67>.
- Latifah, Eny. 2024. "Fiqh Al-Bi'ah and the Concept of Green and Blue Economy for Achieving Sustainable Development in the Context of SDGs." *Invest Journal of Sharia & Economic Law* 4 (1): 74–99. <https://doi.org/10.21154/invest.v4i1.7732>.
- Litbang Riset. 2024. "Nestapa Hutan Papua." *Perspektif* (Jakarta), September 12. [https://lmperspektif.com/2024/09/12/nestapa-hutan-papua/?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://lmperspektif.com/2024/09/12/nestapa-hutan-papua/?utm_source=chatgpt.com).
- Maulana, Irfan. 2025. "Kongkalikong Korporasi dan Penegak Hukum dalam Korupsi Sawit." *MONGABAY* (Jakarta). <https://mongabay.co.id/2025/05/03/kongkalikong-korporasi-dan-penegak-hukum-dalam-korupsi-sawit/>.
- Mongabay, and The Gecko Project. 2019. "Pejabat Pemerintah Ungkap Ada Dugaan Pemalsuan Izin Perkebunan Sawit di Papua." *MONGABAY* (Papua). [https://mongabay.co.id/2019/12/18/pejabat-pemerintah-ungkap-ada-dugaan-pemalsuan-izin-perkebunan-sawit-di-papua/?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://mongabay.co.id/2019/12/18/pejabat-pemerintah-ungkap-ada-dugaan-pemalsuan-izin-perkebunan-sawit-di-papua/?utm_source=chatgpt.com).
- Nabhani, Taqiyuddin an-. 2010. *Sistem Ekonomi Islam*. Printed out. HTI Press.
- Noor, Fitriani. 2018. "Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Berdasar Prinsip Fiqh Al-Bi'ah." *Jurnal Ilmiah Pendidikan Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 3 (1): 47–55. <https://doi.org/10.17977/um019v3i12018p047>.
- O'Neill, Kirstie. 2024. "Green Everywhere? Institutional Greenwashing and Injustice in the Green Economy." In *Research Handbook on the Green Economy*, edited by Andrew Jones and Patrik Ström. Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789904833.00026>.
- Prayoga, Dimas. 2024. "Ambisi dan Pelanggaran Proyek Tanah Merah di Boven Digoel Pertarungan Antara Izin Hutan dan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Adat." *Time News* (Jakarta), July 10. [https://www.timenews.co.id/ragam/99513043587/ambisi-dan-pelanggaran-proyek-tanah-merah-di-boven-digoel-pertarungan-antara-izin-hutan-dan-kesejahteraan-masyarakat-adat?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.timenews.co.id/ragam/99513043587/ambisi-dan-pelanggaran-proyek-tanah-merah-di-boven-digoel-pertarungan-antara-izin-hutan-dan-kesejahteraan-masyarakat-adat?utm_source=chatgpt.com).
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*.
- Redaksi, Amarta. 2025. "Beragam Solusi Amarta untuk Kesejahteraan Merata." *amartha.com* (Jakarta), On Line Edition. <https://amartha.com/>.
- Salim, Amir Salim, Anggun Purnamasari, and Widi Nugraha. 2023. "Pemikiran Ekonomi Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani Tentang Kepemilikan Menurut Ekonomi Islam, Kapitalis Dan Sosialis." *Ekonomica Sharia: Jurnal Pemikiran Dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Syariah* 8 (2): 337–46. <https://doi.org/10.36908/esha.v8i2.627>.
- Salwa, Adelia, Ashari Ashari, Henny Muldia, et al. 2023. "Agrarian Conflict in Urutsewu: Political

Ecology Approach.” QISTINA: Jurnal Multidisiplin Indonesia 2 (1): 119–33. <https://doi.org/10.57235/qistina.v2i1.575>.

Saputra, Taufik Aris, and Aang Kunaifi. 2024. Islamic Economic Politics And Policy For The Use Of Artificial Intelligence In The Defense Sector. 7 (3).

Setiawan, Roy and Maudy Noor Fadlhia. 2025. “Green But Extractive: Diplomasi Hilirisasi Nikel Indonesia Dan Politik Eksklusi Sosial Di Weda Bay.” Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik 5 (1): 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.51622/jispol.v5i1.2721>.

Setyowati, Desy. 2017. “Datanya Diragukan Pemerintah, Oxfam Janjikan Klarifikasi.” Katadata (Jakarta), February 27. [https://katadata.co.id/finansial/makro/5e9a567b2c094/data-ketimpangannya-diragukan-pemerintah-oxfam-janjikan-klarifikasi?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://katadata.co.id/finansial/makro/5e9a567b2c094/data-ketimpangannya-diragukan-pemerintah-oxfam-janjikan-klarifikasi?utm_source=chatgpt.com).

Siregar, Syahrutuah. 2025. “Estimation of the Effect of Carbon Tax Implementation on Household Income Distribution in Indonesia: Quantitative Analysis with Miyazawa Input- Output Approach.” Version 1. Preprint, arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2501.08177>.

Unairnews. 2023. “Regulatory Capture in Energy Sector: Evidence from Indonesia.” Universitas Airlangga. [https://unair.ac.id/regulatory-capture-in-energy-sector-evidence-from-indonesia/?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://unair.ac.id/regulatory-capture-in-energy-sector-evidence-from-indonesia/?utm_source=chatgpt.com).

Wardhana, Chrisna Satya. 2024. “Dua Sisi Mata Uang Yang Harus Diperhatikan Dalam Perjalanan Menuju Pembangunan Berkelanjutan.” Syntax Literate ; Jurnal Ilmiah Indonesia 9 (7): 3406–16. <https://doi.org/10.36418/syntax-literate.v9i7.15724>.

Wijaya, Trissia, and Lian Sinclair. 2025. “An EV-Fix for Indonesia: The Green Development-Resource Nationalist Nexus.” Environmental Politics 34 (2): 252–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2024.2332129>.